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The present paper is divided in two parts​[1]​. In the first part we will propose Meinong’s theory of time outlined in 1899 interpreted in such a way that the subtlety of his argumentation is emphasised. In the second, we will discuss different solutions for the celebrated McTaggart’s paradox, reaching the conclusion that a theory of time suggested by the reflections of the Austrian Philosopher seems to be the most adequate perspective for tackling this problem​[2]​. 
Meinong is concerned with time above all in his essays of 1894 and 1899; thereafter he deals again with the topic only in a cursory manner. Certainly the best of his reflections on the subject is the Third Section of the 1899 essay, and thus we will concern ourselves almost exclusively with this​[3]​. Let us emphasise that time is not a Meinong’s topic, but briefly in the central part of his thinking, i.e. during the passage from his first psychological-descriptive works – influenced by his teacher Brentano – to the theoretical-objective period, stimulated firstly by the reading of Twardowski and Bolzano​[4]​. In spite of this we have the feeling that in this short writing the Austrian philosopher outlines a theory of time which ante litteram opens a possible solution of the paradoxes connected with the flux of time, like McTaggart’s. We have to admire the remarkable subtlety of his psychological analysis, accompanied by a clear awareness of the objectivity of time; the latter helps him to avoid the psychologistic drift of Bergson’s perspective, the former to stay away from the scientistic point of view more and more in fashion in connection with modern physics​[5]​.


Objects of higher order

First we must place the pages on time in the context of the 1899 essay. In this work, Meinong for the first time clearly introduces the notion of “object of higher order” or superius. As is evident from the title, the essay aims to defend the latter concept in front of the fore of inner perception, against Schumann’s (1898) objections. In the First Section he outlines his theory of objects of higher order; in the Second one he shows that if one keeps to an exceedingly restrictive notion of inner perception, not only objects of higher order, but also many other psychical phenomena, whose existence is already received, would be eliminated. Therefore it is necessary to keep in mind the “perceptual fugacity” of many entities. Thus objects of higher order are not easily caught, because of their fugacity. Eventually, since Schumann’s paper is on time, in the Third Section, Meinong proves that the notion of object of higher order helps to solve the famous problem of melody – to which we return below – and he defends his conception against an over-estimation of the immediacy of the self-evidence of inner perception in this particular case. 
Before dealing with the issue of time, let us provide a brief description of Meinong’s ontology, as presented in the First Section. We bypass the distinction between object and content, which in our opinion is not sound; but here we cannot present the reasons supporting our position​[6]​. Then we move from intentionality, i.e. that each psychical phenomenon has an object​[7]​. Moreover some of these objects could be perceived independently (inferiora), whereas others could be grasped only together with certain other objects (superiora)​[8]​. A superius depends one-sidedly​[9]​ on its inferiora, that is it is possible to perceive the latter without grasping the former, but not vice versa​[10]​. Moreover it is possible to capture a relation among inferiora, such as, for instance, two coloured spots – one white and the other black – which are different. Therefore relations, like diversity, are superiora. On the other hand, besides relations, there are superiora, which are constituted essentially not only by a relation, but also by the relata, that is there are superiora which comprehend their inferiora as an essential part of them, such as a melody for instance​[11]​. Meinong calls the latter kind of superiora “complexions”. Hence between complexions and relations the principle “where complexion, there relation and vice versa” holds ​[12]​; for each complexion presupposes a relation and each relation could originate a complexion. 





At least since Brentano​[19]​, the investigation about time in German psychological philosophy in the late nineteenth century often moved from the phenomenon of the listening to a melody. Meinong​[20]​ expounds the problem in the following way:

1. A melody is a superius.
2. Superiora could be grasped only together with the inferiora, on which they depend.
3. On the other hand we perceive one sound at a time; hence we cannot capture a melody.
4. But melody is actually listened to, not only fancifully.

It is clear that there is a contradiction between points 3. and 4. 
Meinong compares himself above all with Stern’s (1897) solution to this problem, according to which the psychical present is not a mathematical point, but has a certain extension, inside which the different sounds of the melody can plays together. 
It is not that Meinong is not persuaded that this is the correct solution, but he want show that there is another one, based on the objects of higher order, which, even if they are not easily caught by inner perception, they are nonetheless not to be eliminated, against Schumann’s objections. 
However in our opinion we find the principal objection to this perspective at the end of the essay​[21]​, where the Austrian philosopher underlines that Stern’s solution restricts the perception of a melody to the set of elements, which could stay inside the time of presence, whereas listening to a melody could be based on an unlimited number of sounds. Moreover he contends the clear-cut distinction between primary and secondary memory​[22]​ – the former refers to what occurs inside the time of presence, whereas the latter concerns objects now completely in the past – emphasising that the former fades gradually into the latter. 
Against Stern’s proposal one can add two further arguments, which are not present in Meinong’s essay. Firstly, it is not clear what is meant by the psychical present having a certain extension, since one cannot understand with respect to which time its length may be measured. The obvious answer should be: “With respect to physical time”; therefore before establishing the extended character of the presence time, one should determine the nature of the physical time; as we will see, Meinong’s approach allows an adequate understanding of the latter. Secondly, it is experimentally​[23]​ proved that the length of presence time with respect to physical time depends on the nature of the perceived phenomenon; thus presence time seems not to be a container of what occurs in our perception, but instead an object founded on our perceptions. We will see below that this empirical fact also favours Meinong’s point of view.
We believe that Meinong’s solution of the melody paradox can be summarised as follows:

1. When we perceive successively a set of inferiora which constitute a certain perceptual unity, not only a superius, but also a new temporality will be founded, which in the same instant of the representation time could have a certain extension, which depends on the nature of the constituted superius. We emphasise that such superius and its temporality are not produced, but found, because the perceptive unity of the inferiora.
2. Therefore together with representation time, i.e. the one in which we experience concretely listening to the single sounds, we have to suppose an object time, whose structure depends essentially on the nature of the superius, which is the result of the successive perception of the inferiora in the representation time.
3. It follows that in a certain instant of the representation time we grasp part or even the whole superius in the object time.
4. When one states that, for instance, the listening of a melody consists of grasping simultaneously the single sounds of the melody but as not contemporaneous, the term “simultaneously” must be referred to the representation time and the term “not contemporaneous” to the object time.

Let us observe that, from Meinong’s point of view, representation time is real; even a past instant is real, because what could be perceived is real and in principle it is not impossible to grasp what is happened​[24]​. On the contrary object time is ideal, because it entails the capturing of temporal relation. That is, inside the object time one can ask whether an event either precedes or follows another; for instance consider the temporal relations between the sounds of a melody. These relations could not be real, because none could be in different instants of representation time. In spite of this they are not subjective in the sense that they subsist ideally. That is, they could be captured in the same way by everyone who is in the adequate perceptive situation. 
Moreover let us observe that Meinong does not deny the extension of the presence time in the sense of Stern​[25]​, but, if our interpretation is correct, its extension could be grasped only on the basis of a particular object time, that is, the one uniform and linear of physical processes. Furthermore the amplitude of presence time will depend on the nature of the phenomena we are perceiving in the Now, and its extension will always be ideal, since it is referred to an ideal time, whereas, from the point of view of representation time, it will be always unitary and not divisible​[26]​.


A formulation of McTaggart’s paradox

The nucleus of McTaggart’s argument (McTaggart, 1927, chap. 33) against the reality of time is considered valid even today (Mellor, 1985, Horwich, 1987, Mancuso, 2004). Here is a formulation of it​[27]​. There are two kinds of temporal characteristics: those we can call of type A, which are properties, as “present”, “past” and “future”, and the relations, which one can call of type B, that is “it is before”, “it is contemporaneous” and “it is after”. Both kinds refer either to events, such as for instance, “the arrival of Caesar to the Rubicon”​[28]​, or to instants. 
If there are properties of kind A, then all three incompatible facts, concerning each event a, subsist in the universe:

The event a is present
The event a is past                 (1)
The event a is future.

In (1) the verb “to be” is intended in a tenseless sense. This is possible, because events are universals. If they were particulars, then they would have an intrinsic temporal determination, that is, they would be  facts; in this case the copula could not be tenseless. 
Before going on, it is necessary to emphasise the analogy between this paradox and that of the melody. In a certain sense, one could say that the problem expressed by (1) lies at the root of the question discussed by Meinong. Indeed the listening of a melody seems to entail that one and the same sound is present and at the same time past or future. Present because we have to listen it, past or future because it must have its place into the melody; i.e. sounds must be listened to simultaneously, but as non contemporaneous. For this reason, as we will see, Meinong’s perspective could be useful in dealing with McTaggart’s paradox. 
One could imagine  resolving the contradiction by maintaining that:

event a is present in the present
event a is past in the future                           (2)
event a is future in the past.

If, according to Mellor (1985, pp. 92ss), “Na”, “Pa” and “Fa” symbolise respectively “a is present”, “a is past” and “a is future”, then one can write (2) in the following manner:

NNa, FPa, PFa                                         (2’),

which are all three compatible facts.
On the other hand, if facts with a double temporal determination were possible, then there would be the following facts as well:

NNa, NFa, NPa                                               (3),






Prior (1967, p. 6) emphasises that the verb “to be”, which appears in the description of facts (1), cannot have tenseless nature. This would be possible only if one considers temporal relations of kind B, since statements such as “a is before b” are tenseless. But the same does not hold for temporal properties of kind A. Therefore he maintains that McTaggart’s problem descends from the attempt to describe A modalities in terms of B modalities. Indeed if the copula in (1) is tensional, then the three facts all become compatible​[30]​.
If one keeps in mind the ontological consequences of relativistic theories, Prior’s analysis has a partial justification. For we know that one cannot consider the time parameter as external to what happens physically, since gravitational forces and velocities influence its magnitude. That is, it is reasonable to believe that the world is not constituted by temporal events, which one can place in the time, but that it is formed by facts, which have an intrinsic temporality. In a more ontologically oriented language, one can state that temporality and events are two inseparable parts of a whole; hence only their union could be a particular, while, taken separately, each one of them is a universal. Moreover, in the field of perception the same occurs: temporality is influenced by what happens, both from a metrical and from a topological point of view (Vicario, 2005). That is, both the temporal order and the lengths of temporal lapses also depend on the perceived contents.
On the other hand, as emphasised by Mellor (1986, pp. 96-98), the problem under investigation is establishing whether the A-series could exist. Indeed any ontological discourse endowed with scientific character must allow the use of tenseless copula, even if one believes that nothing exists independently of time. For the stability and constancy of what happens suggests the constitution of universal tenseless events, to which one can apply a tenseless copula abstractly. Then our question becomes: do A-temporal modalities exist? One has to investigate such a question in a tenseless perspective, even if one believes that in the world nothing exists out of time. Therefore we can and must use the tenseless copula.


The intervention of the B-series

The argument discussed above shows that a universe endowed only with A temporal modalities would be impossible. 
On the other side, in the universe B-modalities might also exist. One could also suppose that the further relation “it is before” is antisymmetric and transitive​[31]​. Therefore, if the number of events is infinite and denumerable, one can establish a many-to-one correspondence between events and natural numbers – that is a correspondence such that to each event corresponds only one natural number​[32]​. Let us call tn the correspondent number to the event n. The correspondence must be such that:

If a is before b, then ta is smaller than tb
If a is after b, then ta is bigger than tb
If a is contemporaneous with b, then ta is equal to tb.

It follows that one can reformulate the three facts (1):

If the event b is present and ta is equal to tb, then a is present
If the event b is present and ta is smaller than tb, then a is past                          (4)
If the event b is present and ta is bigger than tb, then a is future.

The three facts (4) are all compatible.
On the other side, the new event b entails a new ontological incompatibility of the same kind then (1):

The event b is present
The event b is past                 (1’)
The event b is future,

which could be resolved in analogy with (4) through the introduction of another event c:

If the event c is present and tb is equal to tc, then b is present
If the event c is present and tb is smaller than tc, then b is past                          (4’)
If the event c is present and tb is bigger than tc, then b is future.

In other terms, the new event c implies a new contradiction and so on and so on. Again, as in the case of A-modalities, one meets an infinite regress.
To solve the problem, one could choose a suitable instant ti and reformulate the (4) in the following manner:

If ta is equal to ti, then a is present
If ta is bigger than ti, then a is future                     (5)
If ta is smaller than ti, then a is past.

The three facts (5) are all compatible and do not imply any infinite regress. But, as emphasised by Horwich (1987, p. 22), (5) eliminate the temporal modalities A. Indeed one can consider (5) as true definitions of the properties “present”, “past” and “future” in terms of the temporal relations B. On the contrary, (4) are not definitions, since the expression “present” appears in the definiens. At the most one could state that the second and the third in (4) are definitions of “past” and “future” in terms of the notion of “present” together with the aid of the B temporal relations. If one would ascribe again the A character to (5), one have to place the instant ti in the series present-past-future (McTaggart, 1927, §§ 331-332), but then the paradox would once again emerge; that is, one would meets the following three new incompatible facts:

ti is present
ti is past                                            (1’’)
ti is future,

which again bring about an infinite regress. However (5) are not a solution of McTaggart’s paradox, because, although they eliminate the contradiction, they also reduce the A-series to the B-series​[33]​. 
Then it is necessary to look for other ways out from the paradox.


Is the infinite regress vicious?

Quentin Smith (1994) maintains that McTaggart’s infinite regress is not vicious. 
He builds the following series. 

1. Each event is present, past and future​[34]​.
2. Each event (is)​[35]​ present at a present moment, past at a future moment and future at a past moment.
3. Each moment is past, present and future.
4. Each moment (is) present at a higher-level present moment, past at a higher-level future moment and future at a higher-level past moment.
5. Each of these higher-level moments is present, past and future.
And so on, ad infinitum.

Smith underlines that 1., 3. and 5. remain contradictory until one introduces the temporalities of higher-order. Therefore, if one allows an infinite series of temporalities, each pair level is not contradictory in itself. That is, if one stops at level 2., there is no contradiction and the same holds for levels 4., 6. etc.
His formulation of the regress could be interpreted in two different ways: either one assimilates the level 2. to (5), that is to an elimination of A-modalities by means of B-modalities, or to (2)​[36]​, that is to a reiteration of A-modalities. In the first case, as already said, one cannot stop at level 2. and 4., because the A-series would be reduced to the B-series. If one wants true A-modalities, one must stop at levels 1., 3. and 5., which, on the contrary, are contradictory. On the other hand, in the second case, each level is contradictory, because, if double A-modalities are allowed, then beside facts (2) there are facts (3) as well, which are all incompatible. Hence, in both senses McTaggart’s regress is vicious. 
In his seminal essay on McTaggart’s paradox, Michael Dummett (1960) explores another possibility. He maintains that, in the argument, the presupposition that, at least in principle, there exists a complete description of reality is implicit. 
The description of the A-series is necessarily token-reflexive, that is, it uses expressions, whose meaning changes in accordance with the position in the B-series, in which they are enunciated. Although this description is contradictory, this does not mean that the reality of the A-series is contradictory. Indeed the latter issue is not reasonable; hence it could be that the description of the A-series is contradictory, only because a complete description of reality does not exist. Thus only the description of the A-series is contradictory, not the reality of it. 
To sum up, it seems that there are only two ways out from McTaggart’s paradox: to deny either the reality of A-modalities, or the possibility of describing them consistently.


Does time have two dimensions?

Now let us investigate another possible solution of McTaggart’s paradox (Schlesinger, 1994)​[37]​. Let us suppose that the A-temporal determination “present” is located not only with respect to one B-series – let us call it t – but expands itself in a further super-temporal B-series, called T. In such super-time the present of the t-series extends itself indefinitely.
We move again from the three incompatible facts (1):
 
The event a is present
The event a is past                 (1)
The event a is future.

To solve the contradiction we use the t series:

If the event b is t-present and ta is equal to tb, then a is t-present
If the event b is t-present and ta is smaller than tb, then a is t-past                          (6)
If the event b is t-present and ta is bigger than tb, then a is t-future.

But, as we have already seen, the event b entails a new contradiction:

The event b is t-present
The event b is t-past                 (1’)
The event b is t-future.

The new contradiction could be avoided by means of the new B-series, in other words T:

If the event c is T-present and tb is equal to tc, then b is t-present
If the event c is T-present and tb is smaller than tc, then b is t-past                          (4’)
If the event c is T-present and tb is bigger than tc, then b is t-future.

One could ask what would happen to the A-series, which runs along the T-series. For if T did not have an A-series, the (4’) would be a reduction to B-modalities and not a solution of McTaggart’s paradox preserving the A-series. The answer is that there is an A- series for T-Temporality as well and that McTaggart’s paradox for the T-series could be avoided by means of the t-series, following a procedure analogous to the one just expounded, in order to eliminate the paradox in the t-series.





Although it is not acceptable, Schlesinger’s proposal stimulates other reflections. From the epistemic point of view, first we capture the A-modalities, but we know that – as Aristotle often emphasises (Phys. 184a 15) – what is first for us is not necessarily first by nature. Indeed the possibility of measuring a temporal order physically and of successfully using the notion of time in the mechanical and electromagnetic description of the world favours the supposition – at least at the dimension of daily life – of the reality of a transtemporal B-temporal series, which orders events. On the other hand, it becomes quite natural to persuade oneself that A-modalities are a mere illusion, all the more so as they are contradictory. 
We move from the assumption that the analysis of time cannot be only conceptual, in other words it must keep in mind the results of empirical sciences, particularly of physics, psychology and biology. Nonetheless, in the present paper, we attempt only to propose a possible theoretical solution of McTaggart’s paradox, which neither eliminates A-modalities completely, nor renounces to their description, as in Dummett’s point of view. On another occasion we will investigate the empirical justification of our hypothesis​[39]​. The following reflections move from Meinong’s theory of time, as presented in the first part of the paper.
It could be that not all A-modalities are illusory. Let us eliminate the past and the future, and conserve the present. Nevertheless, from a psychological point of view, the present is not a mathematical instant; i.e. with respect to the B-series it has duration, though small, which depends on the perceived contents. For a moment let us leave aside B-temporal series and let us suppose that our primary access to the present would be objective, that is in the world, i.e. independently of the B-series the present had in itself a certain reality. Thus such a present has no duration, i.e. it is a sort of atom of movement, whose description is one of the best results of the Husserlian description of inner consciousness of time (Husserl, 1956, pp. 388ff.). Indeed, according to the German philosopher, time is characterised by a retentional and a protentional halo, which refer to what has just occurred and what is going to occur. Perhaps the Aristotelian definition of movement, as act of a potentiality, in as much it is potential (Phys. 201a 10) is more suitable for capturing such a structure of experience. In other words, the psychological present is not a movement in the Russellian sense of the word (Russell, 1903, § 442), that is being in different states in successive instant of time, but a modal notion, in the sense that if one perceives something, it is also perceived how it was, and how it is going to be. The vagueness of our analysis is partially justified by the fact that the present is probably a concept that cannot further be described in rational terms​[40]​.
In other words, according to this perspective, the present does not run along a B-temporal series, but ontologically precedes the latter. That is, our primary epistemological access to the present is not illusory, as maintained by many scholars, but real. To each present, one has to ascribe a B-series, but present does not run along another B-series, as occurs in Schlesinger’s solution. That is, the set of presents does not constitute a B-series​[41]​. But we should make our analysis of time more precise.
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^1	  The present essay is a re-writing of a conference I gave in Paris on June 2006. I thank Domenico Mancuso, Marina Manotta, Elisa Paganini, Venanzio Raspa and Bruno Vicario for their valuable suggestions. 
^2	  In a very interesting paper, Van Cleve, 1996, clearly grasps that there is a Meinongian solution of McTaggart’s paradox, but he seems unwilling to accept the concept of subsistence. Moreover he does not refer explicitly to Meinong’s theory of time.
^3	  To my knowledge the best available interpretation of these pages is that by Manotta, 2005, pp. 77-90, which aims above all to enlighten the progressive involution of Meinong’s thinking in the direction of an excessively rationalistic perspective. Instead we intend to concern ourselves exclusively with these pages, exploiting them to the full from a theoretical point of view. It is noteworthy that Findlay, 1963 does not deal with this topic.
^4	  See the valuable work of Raspa, 2002.
^5	  We have already attempted to show the value of this essay in Fano, 1996, pp. 187-194.
^6	  On the topic see Fano, 1992/93.
^7	  Meinong, 1899, p. 381.
^8	  Ibidem, p. 386.
^9	  On the contrary two objects as a colour and the extension occupied are in a two-sided dependence.
^10	  Ibidem, p. 387. Therefore this notion is different from the recent concept of supervenience, in which the inferiora determine the superius.
^11	  Ibidem, p. 390. This is not the only Meinongian definition of the notion of relation, but the more perspicuous one.
^12	  Ibidem, p. 389.
^13	  Ibidem, p. 397.
^14	  On the contrary the spots are real.
^15	  Ibidem, pp. 398-99.
^16	  Ibidem, p. 395.
^17	  Ibidem, pp. 399-400. See Manotta, 2005, pp. 33ff., who enlightens the fluctuations of the Austrian philosopher concerning the distinction between found and produced superiora.
^18	  Even on this topic Meinong is not completely clear, because of his strong intellectualist bias; see once more Manotta, 2005, pp. 77ff.
^19	  Brentano, 1874, p. 190.
^20	  Meinong, 1899, p. 440.
^21	  Ibidem, p. 462.
^22	  Recovered by Husserl in the distinction between retention and recollection, Husserl, 1956, p. 35.
^23	  Vicario, 2005, pp. 83-91. Stern, 1897, pp. 340ff.,  himself is aware of this empirical fact.
^24	  Meinong, 1899, p. 457.
^25	  Ibidem, p. 461.
^26	  As correctly emphasized by Manotta, 2005, pp. 79-83, the 1899 analysis does not adequately pick up the problem of the connection between the different instants of representation time – which, on the contrary, was partially discussed in the 1894 essay and will find a more suitable discussion in Husserl, 1956, pp. 27ff.
^27	  In a very clever book, Paganini, 2000, pp. 3ff. showed that McTaggart’s formulation is not really paradoxical. Below we refer to the new formulation of the argument.
^28	  Keeping in mind special and general relativity, we can maintain that our world is constituted by “facts” and not by “events”. The former, but not the latter, are endowed with an intrinsic temporal characteristic. It follows that events are universals.
^29	  The point was emphasized clearly by Dummett, 1960.
^30	  Van Cleve, 1996, maintains something similar.
^31	  We do not consider relativistic phenomena and the dislocation of the psychological time.
^32	  The correspondence is not injective, because the same natural number could be the image of two different events.
^33	  It seems to me that the proposal of J. Cargile, 1999, of considering “to be present” a property that must be ascribed to a moment of the B-series is a reduction of A-modalities to B-modalities as well.
^34	  We eliminate the term “simultaneously”, because the copula is used in a tenseless way.
^35	  The copula with parentheses is tensional.
^36	  The latter seems to be Smith’s intention.
^37	  For a more complete and delicate analysis of the whole reflection of Schlesinger on his two-dimension theory see Paganini, 2000, who also investigates the roots of this theory in the works of Broad.
^38	  One can say that “a is past” is, as it were, a quasi-fact, because its temporality is not completely determined.
^39	  The investigation of Friedman, 1990 seems particularly significant.
^40	  In this context Dummett’s issue, according to which a complete description of reality is difficult or even impossible, seems more reasonable.
^41	  Note that this perspective solves what Paganini, 2000, p. 35ff., calls the paradox of Smart and Williams, according to which, if the moving now is in any sense objective, one could ask at what velocity it runs. Here this question is devoid of sense, because the series of presents has no metric in itself, therefore it does not allow the definition of a concept of velocity.
